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ABSTRACT
Markets for information and entertainment are frequently characterized by increasing re-
turns to scale in production and distribution. This implies that incumbent technologies enjoy
an advantage over newcomer technologies; such markets can become locked into an inferior tech-
nology. Governments often heavily inﬂuence media markets through both direct ownership and
censorship. I present a dynamic model with heterogeneity among consumers and ﬁrms in order
to analyze the role of censorship in media markets. I assume there is a negative consumption
externality across consumers and a negative cost spillover which an incumbent producer im-
poses on a newcomer. In a decentralized equilibrium, there is over-production of media from the
incumbent technology. This reduces consumer utility and engenders lock-in of the inferior in-
cumbent technology. I model censorship as a tax on information produced under the incumbent
technology. A central planner who censors incumbent media can improve upon the decentralized
equilibrium by reducing negative consumption externalities and unlocking the superior technol-
ogy. I also show that censorship is only Pareto optimal when coupled with lump-sum transfers
across consumers.
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Information and entertainment markets are unique in at least two ways. First, information goods
are inherently non-rival. One individual can consume a particular book, newspaper, or television
program regardless of the number of other individuals that have consumed the same source of
information. Second, the production and distribution of information is fundamentally characterized
by high ﬁxed costs and low (possibly zero) marginal costs. In such an environment consumers
beneﬁt greatly from the production of information. Perfect competition will push the price of
information towards its low marginal cost. Consequently, potential suppliers of information may
not be able to recoup high ﬁxed costs and face ineﬃciently weak incentives to produce information
in a competitive environment.
Government might resolve the shortcomings of competitively supplied information and enter-
tainment. Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova and Shleifer (2003) estimate that for the average country in
their sample of 97 economies, 29% of newspaper ﬁrms and 60% of television ﬁrms were directly
owned by the state in 1999. They also ﬁnd that state ownership may not improve the performance
of media industries: direct governmental control of media is signiﬁcantly associated with lower civil
liberties, life expectancy, and greater imprisonment of journalists. Starr (2004) shows that over
the past ﬁve centuries, guild licenses, copyrights, postal subsidies and censorship have also been
regularly employed in Europe and the United States to indirectly inﬂuence private sector supply of
information.
In markets for information and entertainment, censorship has exerted a particularly enduring
inﬂuence. It is natural to view censorship as just one policy implemented by generally repressive
governments. However, censorship is often pursued by governments which otherwise foster free
expression. In the United States, government ﬁnes levied on radio and television broadcasters
1increased by 164% over the years 2000-04.1 There is pending legislation in the U. S. which seeks to
increase the maximum ﬁne on broadcast ﬁrms to $250,000 -$500,000 per incident of “indecency.”2
If these ﬁnes are implemented, a broadcast media ﬁrm would face a maximum ﬁne approximately
4-8 times greater than the maximum ﬁne levied for mismanagement of a nuclear power plant in
2004.3
There is little evidence that, once intellectual property rights have been established and admin-
istered, the performance of media industries improves in response to government inﬂuence. Why
is such inﬂuence pervasive? In this paper, I analyze media censorship from the perspective of a
dynamic theoretical model. First, I assume that agents are heterogeneous in their preference for
information. A particular piece of information can be consumed by agents of diﬀerent types since
information is non-rivalrous but I assume that some agents experience disutility from information
consumed by others. Along with this negative consumption externality, I assume the production
of information takes place under increasing returns to scale and that there are two technologies for
producing information: an inferior incumbent and a superior newcomer. These assumptions imply
that social welfare is not maximized in the competitive equilibrium. There is over-production of
the externality-producing information and insuﬃcient adoption of the superior technology.
The possibility that producers might lock-in to inferior technology was ﬁrst proposed in Farrell
and Saloner (1985, 1986) and evidence of the existence of lock-in has been discussed by David
(1985) and Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 2001). My model extends prior work by considering
the role of competitively determined prices in generating lock-in: because of increasing returns, a
newly introduced superior technology produces information with a high price. Under the assump-
1The Federal Communications Commission reports that total indecency ﬁnes were $48,000 in 2000 and $7,928,080
in 2004, see http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/ichart.pdf.
2The lower house of Congress endorsed the $500,000 ﬁne on on February 16, 2005 while the upper house passed
the $250,000 ﬁne on June 21, 2005.
3The maximum Nuclear Regulatory Commission ﬁne of $60,000 in 2004 was obtained from http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2004/, see also Swanson (2005).
2tion that censorship acts as a tax on information produced by an incumbent technology, the price
of information produced by the incumbent technology will rise relative to a decentralized compet-
itive equilibrium. This increase in the incumbent price will engender greater consumption of a
newcomer’s output. Censorship can improve social welfare by simultaneously reducing the nega-
tive consumption externality and encouraging adoption, or “unlocking,” of a newcomer technology.
Provided there are transfers to compensate those who are harmed by the higher price of incum-
bent information, I show that censorship can lead to a Pareto improvement over the unregulated
competitive equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 I describe the model and solve for the
decentralized competitive equilibrium. In Section 3 I describe the central planner’s problem and
derive the socially optimal level of censorship and transfers. I conclude with Section 4 which relates
the model to some empirical issues and outlines some further extensions.
2 The Model and Decentralized Equilibrium
The theory in this paper contains a heterogeneous environment with two types of consumers for
information produced by two types of ﬁrms. The model is dynamic in that the cost of producing
information in the current period depends upon the equilibrium outcome in the prior period. I
begin with a description of the payoﬀs and constraints for consumers and ﬁrms and then solve for
the decentralized competitive equilibrium without censorship.
2.1 Consumers, Technology and Firms
Consumers
I assume there are two types of consumers indexed by i = 1,2. There are a mass of consumers
with Ni denoting the number of consumers of type i. The total number of consumers is N. I
3assume each consumer type will maximize utility over one period so that individuals don’t consider
the impact of their current decisions on the future value of aggregate endogenous variables. Since
there are a mass of consumers, this assumption captures the notion that each consumer is a small
component of the market for information and does not consider the impact of her / his decision on
the aggregate outcome in the future.4
Each individual can consume information produced by one of two ﬁrms: an incumbent and
a newcomer. Variables corresponding to the newcomer ﬁrm will be marked by a tilde so that
consumption of the incumbent information by an individual of type i in period t is xi,t while










where u1 and u2 are scaling parameters.5 Under these utility functions, the incumbent information
consumed by all type two individuals exerts a negative spillover on the type one consumer. One
type of information beneﬁts the type two consumer while simultaneously reducing the utility of the
type one consumer.
The newcomer’s output is technologically superior in two ways. First, the consumption of
4By assuming a one-period horizon for consumers I also indirectly incorporate a coordination problem. In a multi-
period setting, consumers might simultaneously adopt a new technology in order to increase future utility, in which










4newcomer information by the type two individual does not adversely impact the type one individual.
This assumption is particularly appropriate when new techniques for producing information are
inherently more private and less intrusive. Also, I assume that β > α so that, for all consumers,
utility is more sensitive to consumption of the newcomer’s output relative to the incumbent’s output
(the elasticity of utility with respect to ˜ x is greater than the elasticity with respect to x). For both
of these reasons, the newcomer’s output is a technological advancement. Finally, I assume the
negative consumption externality is relatively strong and that it impacts a relatively large mass of
consumers α < (N1/N)η so that the existence of information produced by the incumbent is a net
social burden. Note that this inequality is also suﬃcient to ensure that α < η so that an increase
in consumption of incumbent information which is equal across consumer types will lead to a net
decrease in the utility of the type one individual.
A consumer will pay a price of p (˜ p) for each unit of information purchased from the incumbent
(newcomer) and income is exogenous in each period.6 The budget constraint of a consumer of type
i is therefore:
ptxi,t + ˜ pt˜ xi,t = yn
i,t (3)
where yn
i,t is the net income of a consumer. Government (central planner) transfers across individuals
can alter net income. Since optimal censorship / taxation will reduce the negative spillover on the
type one individual at the expense of the type two individual, transfers will ﬂow from type one
agents to type two agents in order to compensate for the burden of censorship and create a Pareto
improvement: yn
1,t = y1,t − T1,t and yn
2,t = y2,t + T2,t.
Maximization of the utility functions (1)-(2) subject to the budget constraint yields standard
6Many information and entertainment markets are “two-sided”: consumers receive the output of ﬁrms in media
industries on one side of the market for free. Advertisers pay media ﬁrms on the other side of the market. For
more on this point, see Anderson and Coate (2005). In two-sided markets, the output of media ﬁrms is directly free
to consumers although the consumption of unwanted advertisements serves as an indirect price paid by consumers
(Cunningham and Alexander (2004) carefully model advertising as an opportunity cost to consumers). For the sake
of simplicity, I assume that consumers pay media ﬁrms directly and abstract from the role of advertisers.



























where total incumbent demand is xt = N1x1,t + N2x2,t, total newcomer demand is ˜ xt = N1˜ x1,t +
N2˜ x2,t and aggregate gross income is yt = N1y1,t + N2y2,t.7





















Notice that, because α < η, a type one agent beneﬁts from a higher incumbent price. This may seem
counterintuitive but an increase in the price of the incumbent’s output reduces the type two agent’s
consumption of the incumbent’s information (see (4)). This reduces the negative consumption
externality. Both consumers experience lower utility when the newcomer’s price increases while the
type two consumer experiences lower utility when the incumbent charges a higher price.
Technology
I denote the total incumbent good cost by c, and the total newcomer good cost by ˜ c. Each cost
7Total demand is obtained when a balanced budget condition is imposed on the transfers: N1T1,t = N2T2,t.
















t−1 and ˜ x∗
t−1 represent the market-clearing levels of the information good in the prior period
and χ,σ1,σ2 > 0. I also assume 0 < γ < 1. The ﬁrst condition on γ implies that the marginal
cost of production is rising within a particular period while the second assumption implies that in
a market-clearing steady-state, production of each good is characterized by increasing returns to
scale. For example, the average cost of production of the incumbent good in the steady-state is
decreasing in the level of steady-state production (x∗
ss): (χ/σ1)(x∗
ss)−(1−γ).
These functions also feature a negative cost spillover running from the incumbent to the new-
comer. If production of the incumbent good drops the total cost of the newcomer is lower. Negative
cost spillovers are assumed in order to capture additional advantages experienced by an incumbent
technology. In particular, there are reasons to believe that network eﬀects are important in informa-
tion markets. A given technology is often useful because it adheres to a standard. This guarantees
that individual users of the technology can easily exchange information with one another. An in-
cumbent technology, with an existing base of users, is therefore more beneﬁcial to each user. A new
technology is typically more costly to use on a relative basis since it is frequently incompatible with
the existing standard. The assumption of a negative cost spillover serves as an additional source of
entrenchment for the incumbent technology.
Information Firms
I assume there is a representative producer for each of the two types of goods. I further as-
sume that the incumbent goods producer alone faces censorship. Since information produced by
the newcomer does not create a consumption externality, there is no reason to tax the newcomer.
7There are also reasons to believe that a government may fail to censor new techniques for produc-
ing information due to either lags in adjustment of policy or additional complexities involved in
monitoring the new technology.8 I formally model censorship as a production tax of τ for each unit
of revenue received from sales of information by the incumbent to the type two consumer. Under
these assumptions, the proﬁts for the incumbent and newcomer are:
πt = ptN1x1,t + pt(1 − τt)N2x2,t − ct (10)
˜ πt = ˜ ptN1˜ x1,t + ˜ ptN2˜ x2,t − ˜ ct. (11)
I use a perfect competition equilibrium condition that proﬁts for each ﬁrm are zero, this implicitly
assumes that the threat of entry by media ﬁrms drives proﬁts to zero.9 Under this equilibrium

















Note that, because of dynamic increasing returns to scale, higher equilibrium production in the past
leads each ﬁrm to supply its own information at a lower price in the present. Higher production by
the incumbent in the past leads to higher current prices for the newcomer due to the cost spillover.
Also, a higher level of censorship (taxation) increases the price of information for the incumbent.
This ﬁnal result is critical in determining the impact of censorship on the equilibrium behavior of
consumers and ﬁrms.
8The internet is a clear example of an innovation in information technology which is inherently more diﬃcult to
tax.
9This assumption could be loosened in order to analyze the equilibrium under imperfect competition and markups.
Such an analysis is left for future research.
82.2 Market Clearing Price Dynamics
The remainder of the paper analyzes the behavior of consumers and ﬁrms under market clearing
prices which equate the demand for information to supply (market clearing equilibrium values will











































The incumbent market-clearing price depends upon the level of censorship (taxation). Market-
clearing prices for each good depend upon the lagged equilibrium output of each producer due to
dynamic increasing returns to scale. Because prior levels of taxes will inﬂuence the level of market
clearing production in the past, both prices also depend upon the previous level of taxation.
The expressions for the market-clearing level of demand (equations (5) and (6)) can be combined
with market-clearing prices to obtain a system of ﬁrst-order nonlinear diﬀerence equations for



















































9Note that the central planner can always choose the value of kt since it is monotonically increasing
in current taxation and transfers to the type two consumer. This also implies that the central
planner can use current policy to select the incumbent’s price. Higher taxes reduce supply while
greater transfers to the type two consumer increase demand. Either policy increases kt and the
market-clearing price for information produced by the incumbent.
2.3 Decentralized Competitive Steady State
If a central planner does not attempt to inﬂuence the competitive outcome in the steady-state, taxes
and transfers are zero (τss = T1,ss = T2,ss = 0 and yn
i,ss = yi). Also, market-clearing prices are stable
over time as part of a steady-state: p∗
t(0) = p∗
t−1(0) = p∗
ss(0) and ˜ p∗
t(0) = ˜ p∗
t−1(0) = ˜ p∗
ss(0). The













I ﬁnd that as k increases the price of the incumbent’s information rises and the newcomer’s falls.


































Because β > α and γ < 1 the utility of each consumer is increasing in k.
With a higher value of k, demand for the incumbent’s information increases and / or supply
10contracts. As the price of the incumbent’s information rises, both consumers shift their demand
toward the newcomer. The newcomer beneﬁts from increasing returns to scale as its technology
is “unlocked” and the newcomer’s price falls. Both consumers are directly harmed by the higher
price of the incumbent’s information but beneﬁt from the unlocking of the superior technology.
Because this newcomer is superior, this “unlocking” results in a net increase in utility. The utility
of a type one agent increases at a faster rate because the negative consumption externality falls as
consequence of lower incumbent consumption by the type two agent. The competitive equilibrium
features lock-in since consumer welfare can be improved by pushing k above its decentralized value
of kss(0). In the next section, I analyze the socially optimal level of censorship.
3 Social Welfare Under Censorship
I assume the central planner maximizes a particular social welfare function (SWt) which is log-linear
and adjusted for distortions caused by the deviation of the incumbent’s price from the decentralized
equilibrium:



















Under this function, social welfare is higher whenever a consumer’s utility in the centralized market-
clearing equilibrium (U∗
i,t(τt,τt−1)) increases relative to the decentralized market-clearing equilib-
rium (U∗
i,t(0)).10 The utility of each consumer type is weighted by the number of consumers of
that type. Other things equal, social welfare decreases at an increasing rate as the central planner
pushes the incumbent’s price away from the decentralized market-clearing price; λ > 0 captures the
magnitude of this eﬀect. At higher levels of censorship it is more likely that ﬁrms will attempt to
10Note that producer surplus doesn’t enter the social welfare function since I focus on a zero proﬁt competitive
equilibrium in all cases.
11circumvent the central planner’s taxation in order to increase revenues. Although such distortions
are not directly modelled, the third term in the social welfare function addressed the possibility
that greater resources are used to enforce censorship as the information market is pushed far away
from the decentralized competitive equilibrium.11
I investigate the government’s problem under three objectives. First, it is possible that a
government may entirely lack knowledge regarding the superiority of a new technology and solely
design censorship to reduce current negative consumption externalities. I refer to this as a short-
sighted policy. Second, a central planner might pursue a far-sighted objective under which it
uses censorship to both reduce consumption externalities and increase the adoption of superior
technologies in the long run. Finally, social welfare can be maximized in a dynamic context under
which censorship is designed to improve upon the decentralized equilibrium in both the short and
long run. Under each of these objectives I solve for transfers which guarantee Pareto optimal
censorship.
3.1 Short-Sighted Policy
I begin by assuming that the central planner ignores the long-run dynamic implications of censor-
ship. In essence, the government ignores the laws of motion for market-clearing prices (equations
(16) and (17)). This approach is appropriate in a situation where the quality of the newcomer
technology and the dynamic increasing returns to scale are unknown to the central planner. The
government is simply aware of the negative consumption externality and attempts to reduce that
externality in the present. I also assume that the government holds past and future policy exoge-
nous when setting the level of current media taxation. I obtain the government’s objective function
11It is straightforward to solve the social planner’s problem when λ = 0. This creates corner solutions for the
optimal policy which are qualitatively similar to the interior solutions which emerge when λ > 0.
12by combining the indirect utility functions (7)-(8) with the social welfare function above:
































I solve the central planner’s problem by using a two step procedure. First, I ﬁnd the ratio of
market-clearing prices with and without censorship (p∗
t(τt)/p∗
t(0)) which maximizes SW1,t. I then
ﬁnd the level of censorship and transfers which are consistent with the welfare-maximizing price
ratio.



































t(0)]2 − λ < 0. (28)
The second-order condition will hold since I’ve assumed strong negative consumption externalities
and that the mass of type one consumers is suﬃciently great (α < (N1/N)η). A solution to the
ﬁrst-order condition will represent an interior optimum for the central planner.
The ﬁrst-order condition can be manipulated to obtain a quadratic in the ratio of censored to











1 > 1. (29)
Under a short-sighted objective the central planner will choose an incumbent price above the
decentralized market-clearing price.12 This policy reduces the negative consumption externality
12I ignore the second solution to the quadratic since it implies negative prices.
13and results in higher social welfare, relative to the competitive equilibrium. According to this
solution for the central planner’s problem, the incumbent price under censorship is greater as the
number of type one consumers (N1) increases, the negative consumption externality is worse (larger
η) and the distortion from censorship (λ) is lower.
In order for government censorship to represent a Pareto improvement over the decentralized
equilibrium, the utility of each consumer type in the centralized equilibrium must be no less than




2(0). I represent the Pareto
optimal tax which achieves the price ratio (29) by τ
p
1. Combining an assumption that the type
two consumer is indiﬀerent between censorship and the decentralized equilibrium (U∗
2(τ1) = U∗
2(0))

















Notice that the optimal transfers to the type two agent are increasing in type two’s gross income
and the level of prices under censorship.






































the type one consumer will strictly prefer censorship under a short-sighted objective. Consider
(33): as the income of a type one agent increases, it becomes easier for to pay transfers to the
type two agent and still beneﬁt from taxation of the incumbent technology. As the income of the
14type two consumer decreases, transfers to the type two agent decrease and it is more likely that
the type one agent experiences a net beneﬁt from higher incumbent prices (post transfer). The
relative number of agents plays a complicated role in this model. For example, as N1 increases the
burden of compensating transfers is spread across a wider number of consumers but transfers must
be higher since the central planner chooses a higher incumbent price.
The Pareto optimal tax which is consistent with the optimal price ratio (τ
p
1,t) can be obtained
by assuming the central planner’s policy is in place for at least one period.13 According to the
expression for incumbent information demand (equation (5)) the ratio of centralized to decentralized






result with (14) while substituting the expression for the Pareto type two transfer results in an












I ﬁnd that a higher value of κ∗
1 doesn’t necessarily translate into higher censorship / taxation under
a Pareto optimal policy since transfers will, at least in part, directly result in a higher incumbent
price. If the government tries to achieve a higher incumbent price it will need to increase transfer
to the type two consumer in order to meet the Pareto condition. Although total demand does not
depend on the level of transfers (see (5)), higher transfers imply that a larger portion of demand
originates from the type two consumer. The incumbent producer only receives a fraction of this
expenditures from the type two consumer, due to censorship, so it increases p in order to compensate
for lower net revenues.
This point is further illustrated by a non-Pareto policy in which transfers to the type two
13For analytical simplicity, I ignore the issue of adjusting censorship during implementation.
15consumer are zero but overall social welfare increases under censorship. The tax supporting the











Censorship is higher under the non-Pareto policy. There are no transfers, so the central planner
achievers a greater incumbent price through taxation alone. Censorship also increases monotoni-
cally with the incumbent price ratio under a non-Pareto policy.
The implications of censorship are illustrated in Figure 1 where equilibrium prices and consumer
utility are calculated under the parameter values listed in the Appendix.14 I assume that in period
zero the newcomer’s output is produced and consumer under market-clearing conditions.15 In the
decentralized equilibrium without censorship ˜ p falls as the newcomer experiences economies of scale.
In contrast, p increases as the incumbent encounters lower demand for its output and diseconomies
of scale. Both consumer types experience higher utility as the newcomer’s technology is adopted
but after ten periods there is lock-in since the price of the newcomer’s information remains almost
three times greater than the incumbent’s price. In contrast, censorship causes the price of the
incumbent’s information to rise above the price of the newcomer’s information after two periods
have passed.16 Without transfers this unlocking of the superior technology during the ﬁrst two
periods of censorship causes the type two consumer to experience lower utility (relative to the
decentralized equilibrium). The Pareto optimal policy involves over-compensating the type two
consumer with transfers since the government ignores the unlocking beneﬁt created by taxation of
14For the purpose of these ﬁgures, x(0) is the value of x in the decentralized equilibrium, x(κ
∗
i) is the equilibrium
value of x under censorship without transfers, and x(κ
∗p
i ) is the value of x under Pareto optimal censorship including
transfers.
15In period -1 I assume that the price of the newcomer’s information is 100,000 time the price of the incumbent so
that the newcomer produces a very small amount of information initially.
16The optimal tax on the incumbent is approximately 240% in this example.
16the incumbent. Censorship with properly designed transfers is Pareto optimal under a short-sighted
objective.
3.2 Far-Sighted Policy
I now consider a government which maximizes the social welfare function in the long run. In this
circumstance, the central planner considers both the negative consumption externality and the
long-run impact of censorship on technological adoption but ignores the impact of implementing
censorship in the short run. I represent the steady-state level of censorship by τ2.17 According to
the law of motion for the newcomer price (16), the steady state newcomer price is:






In the long run, the newcomer experiences greater returns to scale, and lower prices, as the incum-
bent increases its price. Substitution of this result into the social welfare function (24) yields the
far-sighted objective function:













































Now the utility of both consumer types is increasing in the ratio of centralized to decentralized
prices (see the second and third terms of SW2). Even though the incumbent price is higher under
censorship, the net impact of taxation is an increase in consumer welfare since the newcomer is
both superior and produced under increasing returns to scale (β/γ > β > α). This implies that
Pareto optimal censorship will not require transfers to the type two agent since s/he beneﬁts from
17In this section, I remove the time subscript to denote that a variable is in its steady state.
17censorship in the long run.





















































ss(0)]2 − λ < 0. (40)
Since the newcomer is technologically superior, the second order condition is guaranteed to hold.












1 > 1. (41)
Relative to the short-sighted objective, the central planner will choose a higher incumbent price.
Both the short and far-sighted governments attempt to reduce the consumption externality by
setting a higher incumbent price. The far-sighted government pushes this price even higher in order
to achieve a second goal: greater adoption of the superior technology. All of the prior comparative
statics for the incumbent price continue to hold. Also, the incumbent price is increasing in the
elasticity of utility with respect to newcomer information (β). Unlocking occurs at a lower rate as
γ increases (the steady-state elasticity of average costs with respect to output is 1 − γ in absolute
value). For this reason, the optimal incumbent price decreases in γ.
As discussed above, censorship by itself is Pareto optimal. A far-sighted government does not











As a government places greater weight on the future it pursues higher levels of censorship. Since
18transfers are unnecessary, censorship must be even greater in order to achieve the relatively high
optimal price ratio dictated by the far-sighted objective. Direct transfers to those harmed by
censorship are rarely observed in information markets. This could be a consequence of far-sighted
policy in the presence of lock-in.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the model.18 With far-sighted censorship, the newcomer’s
price falls below the incumbent’s price more quickly and by a larger amount. The type one consumer
experiences a larger beneﬁt from censorship since s/he doesn’t provide transfers. The type two agent
experiences a short-run loss as a consequence of a higher incumbent price. However, unlocking of
the superior technology in the long run compensates for the burden of censorship and leaves the
type two agent better oﬀ after four periods.
3.3 Dynamic Policy
The last central planner problem I consider is maximization of social welfare (equation (24)) over
both the short and long run. Such a policy simultaneously and optimally addresses the negative
consumption externality and lock-in. In order to ﬁnd the optimal dynamic policy, the central
planner will treat the decentralized to centralized price ratios for the incumbent and the newcomer
as two state variables. The government chooses kt from (16) in order to maximize social welfare in
the present and in the future. I assume the central planner applies a discount factor of δ to social





























18This ﬁgure employs the same parameter values as Figure 1. The optimal tax on the incumbent is approximately




































where SWt is given by (24) and the laws of motion for the state variables are obtained from
(16)-(17). The ﬁrst-order condition for the dynamic policy objective is:19


















































The government encounters three beneﬁts from censorship. The ﬁrst two are a lower negative
consumption externality in the present (the ﬁrst term in (46)) and one period in the future (the ﬁrst
term in (47)) since taxation raises the incumbent’s price over two periods. In addition, censorship
reduces the future price of the newcomer’s information (per (48)). The costs of censorship are
determined by: 1) price distortions in the present and the future (see the third term in (46) and
the second term in (47)) and 2) a higher price for the incumbent good in the present (the second
term in (46)). An optimal tax policy equates these marginal costs and the marginal beneﬁts.
19Note that V1 is the partial derivative of the value function with respect to the ﬁrst argument while V2 is the
partial with respect to the second.
20Combining the ﬁrst-order condition with the envelope conditions yields a policy rule which is a




















































2 so the optimal price ratio which emerges in the steady state under a dynamic
policy objective is between the ratio from the short and far-sighted objectives. The government
tries to unlock the superior technology (so the optimal price ratio under the short-sighted objective
is lower), but does this at a slower rate than when s/he has a far-sighted objective since the beneﬁts
of unlocking are deferred.






































The value of x will either explode or converge to zero if x0 deviates from the complementary
solution (the last two terms in (51)). However, it is not optimal for the price ratio to explode or
21converge towards zero. As the price ratio approaches inﬁnity the marginal social welfare loss from
distortions rises at an increasing rate (due to the quadratic) while the marginal beneﬁt is constant
(the constant terms in (49)). This can not maximize social welfare. The same argument holds true
as the price ratio converges towards zero. So, the optimal policy entails setting the price ratio at
the steady state value.
The Pareto optimal policy will involve time-varying transfers to the type two consumer as the
superior technology becomes unlocked. The type two consumer loses utility as a result of a higher
incumbent price every period following implementation of the optimal dynamic level of censorship
(κ∗
3). The law of motion for the newcomer price, (17) can be used to show that j periods after















for j ≥ 1. As time passes (j increases) the newcomer price falls relative to its decentralized level,
thereby providing higher utility for the type two consumer. One can show that this fall in the price





periods have elapsed. For all periods j ≥ j∗ after implementation, transfers to the type two agent

















to the type two consumer in order to compensate for the higher incumbent price. As time passes
22the beneﬁts of unlocking accrue so the transfers to the type two agent decline. Comparing Pareto
transfers under the short-sighted objective (31) to (55) it becomes clear that, for a given ratio of
censored to uncensored incumbent prices, a central planner following a dynamic objective sends
lower transfers to the type two consumer since a dynamic government understands and reacts to
unlocking of the newcomer technology. It is therefore suﬃcient to use (33) with κ∗
3 substituted for
κ∗
1 in order to ensure that the type one agent strictly prefers Pareto optimal censorship.
Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of the model under dynamically optimal censorship. These
results are a hybrid of the short-sighted and far-sighted outcomes. Relative to a far-sighted policy,
the price of the newcomer takes one additional period to fall below the incumbent’s price. The
newcomer’s price does fall fairly signiﬁcantly in the long run as a consequence of unlocking. Under
the Pareto optimal policy, the type one consumer loses some utility as transfers ﬂow to the type two
consumer but the transfers are zero from the fourth period onward. The type one consumer strictly
prefers censorship during all periods. The type two consumer is indiﬀerent between censorship and
the unregulated outcome until the fourth period following which s/he beneﬁts from unlocking of
the superior technology. Censorship is not Pareto optimal in the absence of transfers since, in the
short run, censorship harms the type two consumer.
4 Conclusion
I have presented a model of media markets in which information generates a negative externality
across a heterogeneous group of consumers. The externality introduces an ineﬃciency in the model’s
competitive equilibrium which is compounded by insuﬃcient adoption of a superior technology for
producing information. Censorship can improve upon the competitive equilibrium in two ways.
Through taxation of the incumbent, censorship increases the price of the externality-producing
information and can improve the welfare of the majority of agents. Second, censorship causes a
23shift in the demand for information toward the newcomer ﬁrm since it produces uncensored, and
superior, information. The newcomer consequently experiences increasing returns to scale and
the superior technology is unlocked in the long run. Along with this positive theory, the model
indicates that censorship alone is not Pareto optimal. Media taxation can harm certain agents in
the short run. Provided the beneﬁts from media taxation are suﬃciently large, a central planner
can implement Pareto optimal censorship through appropriate use of lump sum transfers.
There are a number of examples in which censorship seems to have encouraged the adoption of
a superior technology. The information conveyed by broadcast radio and television in the United
States is subjected to a certain level of governmental oversight. Unlike print media, broadcast
industries do not hold an absolute right to free expression since they employ a ﬁnite public resource:
the broadcast spectrum. Since this resource is scarce, government must select the ﬁrms which can
broadcast and (implicitly and explicitly) the type of information which is conveyed to consumers.
Whiteside (1985) shows that, although cable television was initially developed in the late 1940s, it
was not widely employed for the next 35 years. Mullen (2003) notes that the rapid adoption of cable
television in the 1980s followed a landmark court case which prohibited government regulation of
information conveyed over cable systems.20 This is one of the earliest instances in which a censored
incumbent technology was surpassed by an uncensored superior newcomer.
Sakr (1999) indicates that the rapid growth of satellite television in the Middle East was partly
attributable to censorship of domestic television. Internet communication and U. S. satellite radio
are two more technologies which have, to some extent, been unlocked by censorship of incumbent
forms of media. My theory can also shed light on ineﬃciencies in other industries. According to
Cowan and Gunby (1996) the agricultural industry faces two technologies for controlling pests:
chemical pesticides and integrated pest management (IPM). Research suggests that IPM is a su-
20The case was Home Box Oﬃce v. F. C. C. issued by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on
March 25, 1977.
24perior technology but the majority of farms are locked into the use of chemical pesticides. Rare
instances widespread IPM adoption have been orchestrated by government decree. My model
suggests that taxation of chemical pesticides would simultaneously reduce pollution externalities,
encourage the adoption of IPM, and increase government revenues. In contrast, implementation of
IPM by government ﬁat fails to generate revenues.
The existing model could be extended in a number of ways. First, it would be useful to analyze
whether the model’s predictions are robust to uncertainty over externalities and the nature of
technology. In addition, the competitive equilibrium of a model with externalities and lock-in may
be quite diﬀerent when consumers and ﬁrms are more forward-looking. The model also suggests
that taxation may be politically preferred to subsidies as a means for solving ineﬃciencies in
media markets since a subsidy of superior technologies would fail to reduce negative consumption
externalities in the present. A more general approach could investigate this possibility. Finally,
the model’s prediction that superior novel technologies are adapted more rapidly when incumbent
technologies are taxed could be tested empirically.
255 Appendix
5.1 Parameter Values
The following parameter values were employed to obtain Figures 1 - 3. I restrict the theoretical
analysis to the case in which γ < 1 while the ﬁgures are obtained from an assumption that γ > 1.
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